1651

LEVIATHAN

by Thomas Hobbes

Notes on the E-Text.

This E-text was prepared from the Pelican Classics edition of Leviathan,

which in turn was prepared from the first edition. I have tried to

follow as closely as possible the original, and to give the flavour

of the text that Hobbes himself proof-read, but the following differences

were unavoidable.

Hobbes used capitals and italics very extensively, for emphasis,

for proper names, for quotations, and sometimes, it seems, just because.

The original has very extensive margin notes, which are used

to show where he introduces the definitions of words and concepts, to give

in short the subject that a paragraph or section is dealing with, and to

give references to his quotations, largely but not exclusively biblical.

To some degree, these margin notes seem to have been intended to serve

in place of an index, the original having none. They are all in italics.

He also used italics for words in other languages than English, and there

are a number of Greek words, in the Greek alphabet, in the text.

To deal with these within the limits of plain vanilla ASCII,

I have done the following in this E-text.

I have restricted my use of full capitalization to those places

where Hobbes used it, except in the chapter headings, which I have

fully capitalized, where Hobbes used a mixture of full capitalization

and italics.

Where it is clear that the italics are to indicate the text is quoting,

I have introduced quotation marks. Within quotation marks I have

retained the capitalization that Hobbes used.

Where italics seem to be used for emphasis, or for proper names,

or just because, I have capitalized the initial letter of the words.

This has the disadvantage that they are not then distinguished

from those that Hobbes capitalized in plain text, but the extent

of his italics would make the text very ugly if I was to use an

underscore or slash.

Where the margin notes are either to introduce the paragraph subject,

or to show where he introduces word definitions, I have included them

as headers to the paragraph, again with all words having initial capitals,

and on a shortened line.

For margin references to quotes, I have included them in the text,

in brackets immediately next to the quotation. Where Hobbes included

references in the main text, I have left them as he put them,

except to change his square brackets to round.

For the Greek alphabet, I have simply substituted the nearest

ordinary letters that I can, and I have used initial capitals

for foreign language words.

Neither Thomas Hobbes nor his typesetters seem to have had many

inhibitions about spelling and punctuation. I have tried to reproduce

both exactly, with the exception of the introduction of quotation marks.

In preparing the text, I have found that it has much more meaning

if I read it with sub-vocalization, or aloud, rather than trying

to read silently. Hobbes' use of emphasis and his eccentric

punctuation and construction seem then to work.

Edward White edwud@telus.net

Canada Day 2002

1651

LEVIATHAN

by Thomas Hobbes

LEVIATHAN

OR

THE MATTER, FORME, & POWER

OF A COMMON-WEALTH

ECCLESIASTICAL

AND

CIVILL

By Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury.

Printed for Andrew Crooke,

at the Green Dragon

in St. Paul's Churchyard, 1651.

TO

MY MOST HONOR'D FRIEND

Mr. FRANCIS GODOLPHIN

of GODOLPHIN

HONOR'D SIR.

Your most worthy Brother Mr SIDNEY GODOLPHIN, when he lived,

was pleas'd to think my studies something, and otherwise to oblige me,

as you know, with reall testimonies of his good opinion, great in

themselves, and the greater for the worthinesse of his person.

For there is not any vertue that disposeth a man, either to the

service of God, or to the service of his Country, to Civill Society,

or private Friendship, that did not manifestly appear in his

conversation, not as acquired by necessity, or affected upon occasion,

but inhaerent, and shining in a generous constitution of his nature.

Therefore in honour and gratitude to him, and with devotion to your

selfe, I humbly Dedicate unto you this my discourse of Common-wealth.

I know not how the world will receive it, nor how it may reflect on

those that shall seem to favour it. For in a way beset with those that

contend on one side for too great Liberty, and on the other side for too

much Authority, 'tis hard to passe between the points of both unwounded.

But yet, me thinks, the endeavour to advance the Civill Power, should

not be by the Civill Power condemned; nor private men, by reprehending

it, declare they think that Power too great. Besides, I speak not

of the men, but (in the Abstract) of the Seat of Power, (like to those

simple and unpartiall creatures in the Roman Capitol, that with their

noyse defended those within it, not because they were they, but there)

offending none, I think, but those without, or such within

(if there be any such) as favour them. That which perhaps may most offend,

are certain Texts of Holy Scripture, alledged by me to other purpose

than ordinarily they use to be by others. But I have done it with due

submission, and also (in order to my Subject) necessarily; for they are

the Outworks of the Enemy, from whence they impugne the Civill Power.

If notwithstanding this, you find my labour generally decryed, you may

be pleased to excuse your selfe, and say that I am a man that love

my own opinions, and think all true I say, that I honoured your Brother,

and honour you, and have presum'd on that, to assume the Title

(without your knowledge) of being, as I am,

Sir,

Your most humble, and most obedient servant,

Thomas Hobbes.

Paris APRILL 15/25 1651.

THE CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS

THE FIRST PART

OF MAN

INTRODUCTION

1. OF SENSE

2. OF IMAGINATION

3. OF THE CONSEQUENCES OR TRAIN OF IMAGINATIONS

4. OF SPEECH

5. OF REASON AND SCIENCE

6. OF THE INTERIOUR BEGINNINGS OF VOLUNTARY MOTIONS, COMMONLY CALLED

THE PASSIONS; AND THE SPEECHES BY WHICH THEY ARE EXPRESSED

7. OF THE ENDS OR RESOLUTIONS OF DISCOURSE

8. OF THE VERTUES, COMMONLY CALLED INTELLECTUALL, AND THEIR

CONTRARY DEFECTS

9. OF THE SEVERALL SUBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE

10. OF POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, HONOUR, AND WORTHINESSE

11.OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS

12. OF RELIGION

13. OF THE NATURALL CONDITION OF MANKIND AS CONCERNING THEIR

FELICITY AND MISERY

14. OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NATURALL LAWES, AND OF CONTRACT

15. OF OTHER LAWES OF NATURE

16. OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, AND THINGS PERSONATED

THE SECOND PART

OF COMMON-WEALTH

17. OF THE CAUSES, GENERATION, AND DEFINITION OF A COMMON-WEALTH

18. OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVERAIGNES BY INSTITUTION

19. OF SEVERALL KINDS OF COMMON-WEALTH BY INSTITUTION; AND OF

SUCCESION TO THE SOVERAIGN POWER

20. OF DOMINION PATERNALL, AND DESPOTICALL

21. OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS

22. OF SYSTEMES SUBJECT, POLITICALL, AND PRIVATE

23. OF THE PUBLIQUE MINISTERS OF SOVERAIGN POWER

24. OF THE NUTRITION, AND PROCREATION OF A COMMON-WEALTH

25. OF COUNSELL

26. OF CIVILL LAWES

27. OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, AND EXTENUATIONS

28. OF PUNISHMENTS, AND REWARDS

29. OF THOSE THINGS THAT WEAKEN, OR TEND TO THE DISSOLUTION OF

A COMMON-WEALTH

30. OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOVERAIGN REPRESENTATIVE

31. OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD BY NATURE

THE THIRD PART

OF A CHRISTIAN COMMON-WEALTH

32. OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN POLITIQUES

33. OF THE NUMBER, ANTIQUITY, SCOPE, AUTHORITY, AND INTERPRETERS

OF THE BOOKS OF HOLY SCRIPTURE.

34. OF THE SIGNIFICATION, OF SPIRIT, ANGELL, AND INSPIRATION

IN THE BOOKS OF HOLY SCRIPTURE

35. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF THE KINGDOME OF GOD,

OF HOLY, SACRED, AND SACRAMENT

36. OF THE WORD OF GOD, AND OF PROPHETS

37. OF MIRACLES, AND THEIR USE

38. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF ETERNALL LIFE, HEL,

SALVATION, THE WORLD TO COME, AND REDEMPTION

39. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF THE WORD CHURCH

40. OF THE RIGHTS OF THE KINGDOME OF GOD, IN ABRAHAM, MOSES,

THE HIGH PRIESTS, AND THE KINGS OF JUDAH

41. OF THE OFFICE OF OUR BLESSED SAVIOUR

42. OF POWER ECCLESIASTICALL

43. OF WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR MANS RECEPTION INTO THE KINGDOME OF HEAVEN

THE FOURTH PART

OF THE KINGDOME OF DARKNESSE

44. OF SPIRITUALL DARKNESSE FROM MISINTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE

45. OF DAEMONOLOGY, AND OTHER RELIQUES OF THE RELIGION OF THE GENTILES

46. OF DARKNESSE FROM VAINE PHILOSOPHY, AND FABULOUS TRADITIONS

47. OF THE BENEFIT PROCEEDING FROM SUCH DARKNESSE; AND TO WHOM

IT ACCREWETH

48. A REVIEW AND CONCLUSION

THE INTRODUCTION

Nature (the art whereby God hath made and governes the world) is

by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated,

that it can make an Artificial Animal. For seeing life is but a

motion of Limbs, the begining whereof is in some principall part within;

why may we not say, that all Automata (Engines that move themselves

by springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have an artificiall life?

For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings;

and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole Body,

such as was intended by the Artificer? Art goes yet further,

imitating that Rationall and most excellent worke of Nature, Man.

For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH,

or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man;

though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose

protection and defence it was intended; and in which, the Soveraignty

is an Artificiall Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body;

The Magistrates, and other Officers of Judicature and Execution,

artificiall Joynts; Reward and Punishment (by which fastned to the seat

of the Soveraignty, every joynt and member is moved to performe his duty)

are the Nerves, that do the same in the Body Naturall; The Wealth and

Riches of all the particular members, are the Strength; Salus Populi

(the Peoples Safety) its Businesse; Counsellors, by whom all things

needfull for it to know, are suggested unto it, are the Memory;

Equity and Lawes, an artificiall Reason and Will; Concord, Health;

Sedition, Sicknesse; and Civill War, Death. Lastly, the Pacts and

Covenants, by which the parts of this Body Politique were at first made,

set together, and united, resemble that Fiat, or the Let Us Make Man,

pronounced by God in the Creation.

To describe the Nature of this Artificiall man, I will consider

First the Matter thereof, and the Artificer; both which is Man.

Secondly, How, and by what Covenants it is made; what are the Rights

and just Power or Authority of a Soveraigne; and what it is that

Preserveth and Dissolveth it.

Thirdly, what is a Christian Common-Wealth.

Lastly, what is the Kingdome of Darkness.

Concerning the first, there is a saying much usurped of late,

That Wisedome is acquired, not by reading of Books, but of Men.

Consequently whereunto, those persons, that for the most part can

give no other proof of being wise, take great delight to shew what

they think they have read in men, by uncharitable censures of one

another behind their backs. But there is another saying not of late

understood, by which they might learn truly to read one another,

if they would take the pains; and that is, Nosce Teipsum, Read Thy Self:

which was not meant, as it is now used, to countenance, either

the barbarous state of men in power, towards their inferiors;

or to encourage men of low degree, to a sawcie behaviour towards

their betters; But to teach us, that for the similitude of the thoughts,

and Passions of one man, to the thoughts, and Passions of another,

whosoever looketh into himselfe, and considereth what he doth,

when he does Think, Opine, Reason, Hope, Feare, &c, and upon what grounds;

he shall thereby read and know, what are the thoughts, and Passions

of all other men, upon the like occasions. I say the similitude

of Passions, which are the same in all men, Desire, Feare, Hope, &c;

not the similitude or The Objects of the Passions, which are the things

Desired, Feared, Hoped, &c: for these the constitution individuall,

and particular education do so vary, and they are so easie to be kept

from our knowledge, that the characters of mans heart, blotted and

confounded as they are, with dissembling, lying, counterfeiting,

and erroneous doctrines, are legible onely to him that searcheth hearts.

And though by mens actions wee do discover their designee sometimes;

yet to do it without comparing them with our own, and distinguishing

all circumstances, by which the case may come to be altered,

is to decypher without a key, and be for the most part deceived,

by too much trust, or by too much diffidence; as he that reads,

is himselfe a good or evill man.

But let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly,

it serves him onely with his acquaintance, which are but few.

He that is to govern a whole Nation, must read in himselfe, not this,

or that particular man; but Man-kind; which though it be hard to do,

harder than to learn any Language, or Science; yet, when I shall have

set down my own reading orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another,

will be onely to consider, if he also find not the same in himselfe.

For this kind of Doctrine, admitteth no other Demonstration.

PART 1 OF MAN

CHAPTER 1

OF SENSE

Concerning the Thoughts of man, I will consider them first Singly,

and afterwards in Trayne, or dependance upon one another.

Singly, they are every one a Representation or Apparence,

of some quality, or other Accident of a body without us;

which is commonly called an Object. Which Object worketh on

the Eyes, Eares, and other parts of mans body; and by diversity

of working, produceth diversity of Apparences.

The Originall of them all, is that which we call Sense; (For there

is no conception in a mans mind, which hath not at first, totally,

or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of Sense.) The rest are

derived from that originall.

To know the naturall cause of Sense, is not very necessary to

the business now in hand; and I have els-where written of

the same at large. Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method,

I will briefly deliver the same in this place.

The cause of Sense, is the Externall Body, or Object, which

presseth the organ proper to each Sense, either immediatly,

as in the Tast and Touch; or mediately, as in Seeing, Hearing,

and Smelling: which pressure, by the mediation of Nerves, and other

strings, and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the Brain,

and Heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure,

or endeavour of the heart, to deliver it self: which endeavour

because Outward, seemeth to be some matter without. And this Seeming,

or Fancy, is that which men call sense; and consisteth, as to the Eye,

in a Light, or Colour Figured; To the Eare, in a Sound; To the Nostrill,

in an Odour; To the Tongue and Palat, in a Savour; and to the rest

of the body, in Heat, Cold, Hardnesse, Softnesse, and such other qualities,

as we discern by Feeling. All which qualities called Sensible,

are in the object that causeth them, but so many several motions

of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversly. Neither in

us that are pressed, are they anything els, but divers motions;

(for motion, produceth nothing but motion.) But their apparence to

us is Fancy, the same waking, that dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing,

or striking the Eye, makes us fancy a light; and pressing the Eare,

produceth a dinne; so do the bodies also we see, or hear, produce

the same by their strong, though unobserved action, For if those

Colours, and Sounds, were in the Bodies, or Objects that cause them,

they could not bee severed from them, as by glasses, and in Ecchoes

by reflection, wee see they are; where we know the thing we see,

is in one place; the apparence, in another. And though at some

certain distance, the reall, and very object seem invested with

the fancy it begets in us; Yet still the object is one thing,

the image or fancy is another. So that Sense in all cases,

is nothing els but originall fancy, caused (as I have said)

by the pressure, that is, by the motion, of externall things

upon our Eyes, Eares, and other organs thereunto ordained.

But the Philosophy-schooles, through all the Universities of Christendome,

grounded upon certain Texts of Aristotle, teach another doctrine;

and say, For the cause of Vision, that the thing seen, sendeth forth

on every side a Visible Species(in English) a Visible Shew, Apparition,

or Aspect, or a Being Seen; the receiving whereof into the Eye, is Seeing.

And for the cause of Hearing, that the thing heard, sendeth forth

an Audible Species, that is, an Audible Aspect, or Audible Being Seen;

which entring at the Eare, maketh Hearing. Nay for the cause of

Understanding also, they say the thing Understood sendeth forth

Intelligible Species, that is, an Intelligible Being Seen;

which comming into the Understanding, makes us Understand.

I say not this, as disapproving the use of Universities: but because

I am to speak hereafter of their office in a Common-wealth, I must

let you see on all occasions by the way, what things would be amended

in them; amongst which the frequency of insignificant Speech is one.

CHAPTER II

OF IMAGINATION

That when a thing lies still, unlesse somewhat els stirre it,

it will lye still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of.

But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion,

unless somewhat els stay it, though the reason be the same,

(namely, that nothing can change it selfe,) is not so easily assented to.

For men measure, not onely other men, but all other things, by themselves:

and because they find themselves subject after motion to pain,

and lassitude, think every thing els growes weary of motion,

and seeks repose of its own accord; little considering, whether

it be not some other motion, wherein that desire of rest they find

in themselves, consisteth. From hence it is, that the Schooles say,

Heavy bodies fall downwards, out of an appetite to rest, and to conserve

their nature in that place which is most proper for them; ascribing

appetite, and Knowledge of what is good for their conservation,

(which is more than man has) to things inanimate absurdly.

When a Body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something els

hinder it) eternally; and whatsoever hindreth it, cannot in an instant,

but in time, and by degrees quite extinguish it: And as wee see

in the water, though the wind cease, the waves give not over rowling

for a long time after; so also it happeneth in that motion, which is

made in the internall parts of a man, then, when he Sees, Dreams, &c.

For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, wee still retain

an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it.

And this is it, that Latines call Imagination, from the image made

in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses.

But the Greeks call it Fancy; which signifies Apparence, and is as proper

to one sense, as to another. Imagination therefore is nothing but

Decaying Sense; and is found in men, and many other living Creatures,

as well sleeping, as waking.

Memory

The decay of Sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion

made in sense; but an obscuring of it, in such manner, as the light

of the Sun obscureth the light of the Starres; which starrs do no

less exercise their vertue by which they are visible, in the day,

than in the night. But because amongst many stroaks, which our eyes,

eares, and other organs receive from externall bodies, the predominant

onely is sensible; therefore the light of the Sun being predominant,

we are not affected with the action of the starrs. And any object being

removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in us remain;

yet other objects more present succeeding, and working on us,

the Imagination of the past is obscured, and made weak; as the voyce

of a man is in the noyse of the day. From whence it followeth,

that the longer the time is, after the sight, or Sense of any object,

the weaker is the Imagination. For the continuall change of mans body,

destroyes in time the parts which in sense were moved: So that the

distance of time, and of place, hath one and the same effect in us.

For as at a distance of place, that which wee look at, appears dimme,

and without distinction of the smaller parts; and as Voyces grow weak,

and inarticulate: so also after great distance of time, our imagination of

the Past is weak; and wee lose( for example) of Cities wee have seen,

many particular Streets; and of Actions, many particular Circumstances.

This Decaying Sense, when wee would express the thing it self,

(I mean Fancy it selfe,) wee call Imagination, as I said before;

But when we would express the Decay, and signifie that the Sense is fading,

old, and past, it is called Memory. So that Imagination and Memory,

are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names.

Much memory, or memory of many things, is called Experience.

Againe, Imagination being only of those things which have been formerly

perceived by Sense, either all at once, or by parts at severall times;

The former, (which is the imagining the whole object, as it was

presented to the sense) is Simple Imagination; as when one imagineth

a man, or horse, which he hath seen before. The other is Compounded;

as when from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another,

we conceive in our mind a Centaure. So when a man compoundeth the

image of his own person, with the image of the actions of an other man;

as when a man imagins himselfe a Hercules, or an Alexander,

(which happeneth often to them that are much taken with reading of Romants)

it is a compound imagination, and properly but a Fiction of the mind.

There be also other Imaginations that rise in men, (though waking)

from the great impression made in sense; As from gazing upon the Sun,

the impression leaves an image of the Sun before our eyes a long

time after; and from being long and vehemently attent upon

Geometricall Figures, a man shall in the dark, (though awake)

have the Images of Lines, and Angles before his eyes: which kind of

Fancy hath no particular name; as being a thing that doth not

commonly fall into mens discourse.

Dreams

The imaginations of them that sleep, are those we call Dreams.

And these also (as all other Imaginations) have been before,

either totally, or by parcells in the Sense. And because in sense,

the Brain, and Nerves, which are the necessary Organs of sense,

are so benummed in sleep, as not easily to be moved by the action

of Externall Objects, there can happen in sleep, no Imagination;

and therefore no Dreame, but what proceeds from the agitation of

the inward parts of mans body; which inward parts, for the connexion

they have with the Brayn, and other Organs, when they be distempered,

do keep the same in motion; whereby the Imaginations there formerly made,

appeare as if a man were waking; saving that the Organs of Sense

being now benummed, so as there is no new object, which can master

and obscure them with a more vigorous impression, a Dreame must needs

be more cleare, in this silence of sense, than are our waking thoughts.

And hence it cometh to pass, that it is a hard matter, and by many

thought impossible to distinguish exactly between Sense and Dreaming.

For my part, when I consider, that in Dreames, I do not often,

nor constantly think of the same Persons, Places, Objects, and Actions that

I do waking; nor remember so long a trayne of coherent thoughts, Dreaming,

as at other times; And because waking I often observe the absurdity

of Dreames, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking Thoughts;

I am well satisfied, that being awake, I know I dreame not;

though when I dreame, I think my selfe awake.

And seeing dreames are caused by the distemper of some of the inward

parts of the Body; divers distempers must needs cause different Dreams.

And hence it is, that lying cold breedeth Dreams of Feare,

and raiseth the thought and Image of some fearfull object

(the motion from the brain to the inner parts, and from the

inner parts to the Brain being reciprocall:) and that as Anger

causeth heat in some parts of the Body, when we are awake;

so when we sleep, the over heating of the same parts causeth Anger,

and raiseth up in the brain the Imagination of an Enemy.

In the same manner; as naturall kindness, when we are awake

causeth desire; and desire makes heat in certain other parts

of the body; so also, too much heat in those parts, while wee sleep,

raiseth in the brain an imagination of some kindness shewn.

In summe, our Dreams are the reverse of our waking Imaginations;

The motion when we are awake, beginning at one end; and when we Dream,

at another.

Apparitions Or Visions

The most difficult discerning of a mans Dream, from his waking thoughts,

is then, when by some accident we observe not that we have slept:

which is easie to happen to a man full of fearfull thoughts;

and whose conscience is much troubled; and that sleepeth,

without the circumstances, of going to bed, or putting off his clothes,

as one that noddeth in a chayre. For he that taketh pains,

and industriously layes himselfe to sleep, in case any uncouth and

exorbitant fancy come unto him, cannot easily think it other than a Dream.

We read of Marcus Brutes, (one that had his life given him by Julius

Caesar, and was also his favorite, and notwithstanding murthered him,)

how at Phillipi, the night before he gave battell to Augustus Caesar,

he saw a fearfull apparition, which is commonly related by Historians

as a Vision: but considering the circumstances, one may easily judge

to have been but a short Dream. For sitting in his tent, pensive and

troubled with the horrour of his rash act, it was not hard for him,

slumbering in the cold, to dream of that which most affrighted him;

which feare, as by degrees it made him wake; so also it must needs make

the Apparition by degrees to vanish: And having no assurance that he slept,

he could have no cause to think it a Dream, or any thing but a Vision.

And this is no very rare Accident: for even they that be perfectly awake,

if they be timorous, and supperstitious, possessed with fearfull tales,

and alone in the dark, are subject to the like fancies, and believe

they see spirits and dead mens Ghosts walking in Churchyards;

whereas it is either their Fancy onely, or els the knavery of such persons,

as make use of such superstitious feare, to pass disguised in the night,

to places they would not be known to haunt.

From this ignorance of how to distinguish Dreams, and other strong Fancies,

from vision and Sense, did arise the greatest part of the Religion of

the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped Satyres, Fawnes, nymphs,

and the like; and now adayes the opinion than rude people have of Fayries,

Ghosts, and Goblins; and of the power of Witches. For as for Witches,

I think not that their witch craft is any reall power; but yet that

they are justly punished, for the false beliefe they have, that they can

do such mischiefe, joyned with their purpose to do it if they can;

their trade being neerer to a new Religion, than to a Craft or Science.

And for Fayries, and walking Ghosts, the opinion of them has I think been

on purpose, either taught, or not confuted, to keep in credit the use

of Exorcisme, of Crosses, of holy Water, and other such inventions

of Ghostly men. Neverthelesse, there is no doubt, but God can make

unnaturall Apparitions. But that he does it so often, as men need

to feare such things, more than they feare the stay, or change,

of the course of Nature, which he also can stay, and change,

is no point of Christian faith. But evill men under pretext

that God can do any thing, are so bold as to say any thing

when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue; It is the part

of a wise man, to believe them no further, than right reason makes

that which they say, appear credible. If this superstitious fear

of Spirits were taken away, and with it, Prognostiques from Dreams,

false Prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by which,

crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much

more fitted than they are for civill Obedience.

And this ought to be the work of the Schooles; but they rather nourish

such doctrine. For (not knowing what Imagination, or the Senses are),

what they receive, they teach: some saying, that Imaginations rise

of themselves, and have no cause: Others that they rise most commonly

from the Will; and that Good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man,

by God; and evill thoughts by the Divell: or that Good thoughts are

powred (infused) into a man, by God; and evill ones by the Divell.

Some say the Senses receive the Species of things, and deliver them to

the Common-sense; and the Common Sense delivers them over to the Fancy,

and the Fancy to the Memory, and the Memory to the Judgement,

like handing of things from one to another, with many words making

nothing understood.

Understanding.

The Imagination that is raysed in man (or any other creature indued

with the faculty of imagining) by words, or other voluntary signes,

is that we generally call Understanding; and is common to Man and Beast.

For a dogge by custome will understand the call, or the rating of

his Master; and so will many other Beasts. That Understanding which

is peculiar to man, is the Understanding not onely his will; but his

conceptions and thoughts, by the sequell and contexture of the names

of things into Affirmations, Negations, and other formes of Speech:

And of this kinde of Understanding I shall speak hereafter.

CHAPTER III

OF THE CONSEQUENCE OR TRAYNE OF IMAGINATIONS

By Consequence, or Trayne of Thoughts, I understand that succession

of one Thought to another, which is called (to distinguish it from

Discourse in words) Mentall Discourse.

When a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever, His next Thought after,

is not altogether so casuall as it seems to be. Not every Thought

to every Thought succeeds indifferently. But as wee have no Imagination,

whereof we have not formerly had Sense, in whole, or in parts;

so we have no Transition from one Imagination to another, whereof we

never had the like before in our Senses. The reason whereof is this.

All Fancies are Motions within us, reliques of those made in the Sense:

And those motions that immediately succeeded one another in the sense,

continue also together after Sense: In so much as the former comming

again to take place, and be praedominant, the later followeth,

by coherence of the matter moved, is such manner, as water upon a plain

Table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger.

But because in sense, to one and the same thing perceived, sometimes

one thing, sometimes another succeedeth, it comes to passe in time,

that in the Imagining of any thing, there is no certainty what

we shall Imagine next; Onely this is certain, it shall be something

that succeeded the same before, at one time or another.

Trayne Of Thoughts Unguided

This Trayne of Thoughts, or Mentall Discourse, is of two sorts.

The first is Unguided, Without Designee, and inconstant; Wherein there is

no Passionate Thought, to govern and direct those that follow,

to it self, as the end and scope of some desire, or other passion:

In which case the thoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent one

to another, as in a Dream. Such are Commonly the thoughts of men,

that are not onely without company, but also without care of any thing;

though even then their Thoughts are as busie as at other times,

but without harmony; as the sound which a Lute out of tune would yeeld

to any man; or in tune, to one that could not play. And yet in this

wild ranging of the mind, a man may oft-times perceive the way of it,

and the dependance of one thought upon another. For in a Discourse

of our present civill warre, what could seem more impertinent,

than to ask (as one did) what was the value of a Roman Penny?

Yet the Cohaerence to me was manifest enough. For the Thought of the

warre, introduced the Thought of the delivering up the King to his Enemies;

The Thought of that, brought in the Thought of the delivering up of Christ;

and that again the Thought of the 30 pence, which was the price

of that treason: and thence easily followed that malicious question;

and all this in a moment of time; for Thought is quick.

Trayne Of Thoughts Regulated

The second is more constant; as being Regulated by some desire,

and designee. For the impression made by such things as wee desire,

or feare, is strong, and permanent, or, (if it cease for a time,) of

quick return: so strong it is sometimes, as to hinder and break our sleep.

From Desire, ariseth the Thought of some means we have seen produce

the like of that which we ayme at; and from the thought of that,

the thought of means to that mean; and so continually, till we come

to some beginning within our own power. And because the End,

by the greatnesse of the impression, comes often to mind, in case our

thoughts begin to wander, they are quickly again reduced into the way:

which observed by one of the seven wise men, made him give men

this praecept, which is now worne out, Respice Finem; that is to say,

in all your actions, look often upon what you would have, as the thing

that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it.

Remembrance

The Trayn of regulated Thoughts is of two kinds; One, when of

an effect imagined, wee seek the causes, or means that produce it:

and this is common to Man and Beast. The other is, when imagining

any thing whatsoever, wee seek all the possible effects, that can

by it be produced; that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it,

when wee have it. Of which I have not at any time seen any signe,

but in man onely; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the

nature of any living creature that has no other Passion but sensuall,

such as are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. In summe, the Discourse

of the Mind, when it is governed by designee, is nothing but Seeking,

or the faculty of Invention, which the Latines call Sagacitas,

and Solertia; a hunting out of the causes, of some effect,

present or past; or of the effects, of some present or past cause.

sometimes a man seeks what he hath lost; and from that place, and time,

wherein hee misses it, his mind runs back, from place to place,

and time to time, to find where, and when he had it; that is to say,

to find some certain, and limited time and place, in which to begin

a method of seeking. Again, from thence, his thoughts run over

the same places and times, to find what action, or other occasion

might make him lose it. This we call Remembrance, or Calling to mind:

the Latines call it Reminiscentia, as it were a Re-Conning

of our former actions.

Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compasse whereof

his is to seek; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof,

in the same manner, as one would sweep a room, to find a jewell;

or as a Spaniel ranges the field, till he find a sent; or as a man

should run over the alphabet, to start a rime.

Prudence

Sometime a man desires to know the event of an action; and then

he thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof

one after another; supposing like events will follow like actions.

As he that foresees what wil become of a Criminal, re-cons what he has

seen follow on the like Crime before; having this order of thoughts,

The Crime, the Officer, the Prison, the Judge, and the Gallowes.

Which kind of thoughts, is called Foresight, and Prudence,

or Providence; and sometimes Wisdome; though such conjecture,

through the difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious.

But this is certain; by how much one man has more experience of

things past, than another; by so much also he is more Prudent,

and his expectations the seldomer faile him. The Present onely

has a being in Nature; things Past have a being in the Memory onely,

but things To Come have no being at all; the Future being but a

fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions Past,

to the actions that are Present; which with most certainty is done

by him that has most Experience; but not with certainty enough.

And though it be called Prudence, when the Event answereth our Expectation;

yet in its own nature, it is but Presumption. For the foresight

of things to come, which is Providence, belongs onely to him

by whose will they are to come. From him onely, and supernaturally,

proceeds Prophecy. The best Prophet naturally is the best guesser;

and the best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters

he guesses at: for he hath most Signes to guesse by.

Signes

A Signe, is the Event Antecedent, of the Consequent; and contrarily,

the Consequent of the Antecedent, when the like Consequences have

been observed, before: And the oftner they have been observed,

the lesse uncertain is the Signe. And therefore he that has most

experience in any kind of businesse, has most Signes, whereby to guesse at

the Future time, and consequently is the most prudent: And so much more

prudent than he that is new in that kind of business, as not to

be equalled by any advantage of naturall and extemporary wit:

though perhaps many young men think the contrary.

Neverthelesse it is not Prudence that distinguisheth man from beast.

There be beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which

is for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten.

Conjecture Of The Time Past

As Prudence is a Praesumtion of the Future, contracted from

the Experience of time Past; So there is a Praesumtion of things Past

taken from other things (not future but) past also. For he that hath

seen by what courses and degrees, a flourishing State hath first come

into civill warre, and then to ruine; upon the sights of the ruines

of any other State, will guesse, the like warre, and the like courses

have been there also. But his conjecture, has the same incertainty

almost with the conjecture of the Future; both being grounded

onely upon Experience.

There is no other act of mans mind, that I can remember, naturally

planted in him, so, as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it,

but to be born a man, and live with the use of his five Senses.

Those other Faculties, of which I shall speak by and by, and which

seem proper to man onely, are acquired, and encreased by study and

industry; and of most men learned by instruction, and discipline;

and proceed all from the invention of Words, and Speech. For besides

Sense, and Thoughts, and the Trayne of thoughts, the mind of man

has no other motion; though by the help of Speech, and Method,

the same Facultyes may be improved to such a height, as to

distinguish men from all other living Creatures.

Whatsoever we imagine, is Finite. Therefore there is no Idea,

or conception of anything we call Infinite. No man can have in

his mind an Image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive the ends,

and bounds of the thing named; having no Conception of the thing,

but of our own inability. And therefore the Name of GOD is used,

not to make us conceive him; (for he is Incomprehensible; and his

greatnesse, and power are unconceivable;) but that we may honour him.

Also because whatsoever (as I said before,) we conceive, has been perceived

first by sense, either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought,

representing any thing, not subject to sense. No man therefore

can conceive any thing, but he must conceive it in some place;

and indued with some determinate magnitude; and which may be divided

into parts; nor that any thing is all in this place, and all in another

place at the same time; nor that two, or more things can be in one,

and the same place at once: for none of these things ever have,

or can be incident to Sense; but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit

(without any signification at all,) from deceived Philosophers,

and deceived, or deceiving Schoolemen.

CHAPTER IV

OF SPEECH

Originall Of Speech

The Invention of Printing, though ingenious, compared with the

invention of Letters, is no great matter. But who was the first that

found the use of Letters, is not known. He that first brought them into

Greece, men say was Cadmus, the sonne of Agenor, King of Phaenicia.

A profitable Invention for continuing the memory of time past,

and the conjunction of mankind, dispersed into so many, and distant

regions of the Earth; and with all difficult, as proceeding from a

watchfull observation of the divers motions of the Tongue, Palat,

Lips, and other organs of Speech; whereby to make as many differences

of characters, to remember them. But the most noble and profitable

invention of all other, was that of Speech, consisting of Names or

Apellations, and their Connexion; whereby men register their Thoughts;

recall them when they are past; and also declare them one to another

for mutuall utility and conversation; without which, there had been

amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor Society, nor Contract, nor Peace,

no more than amongst Lyons, Bears, and Wolves. The first author

of Speech was GOD himselfe, that instructed Adam how to name such

creatures as he presented to his sight; For the Scripture goeth

no further in this matter. But this was sufficient to direct him

to adde more names, as the experience and use of the creatures should

give him occasion; and to joyn them in such manner by degrees,

as to make himselfe understood; and so by succession of time,

so much language might be gotten, as he had found use for;

though not so copious, as an Orator or Philosopher has need of.

For I do not find any thing in the Scripture, out of which,

directly or by consequence can be gathered, that Adam was taught

the names of all Figures, Numbers, Measures, Colours, Sounds, Fancies,

Relations; much less the names of Words and Speech, as Generall, Speciall, Affirmative, Negative, Interrogative, Optative, Infinitive,

all which are usefull; and least of all, of Entity, Intentionality,

Quiddity, and other significant words of the School.

But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity,

was again lost at the tower of Babel, when by the hand of God, every man

was stricken for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former language.

And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into severall parts

of the world, it must needs be, that the diversity of Tongues that

now is, proceeded by degrees from them, in such manner, as need

(the mother of all inventions) taught them; and in tract of time

grew every where more copious.

The Use Of Speech

The generall use of Speech, is to transferre our Mentall Discourse,

into Verbal; or the Trayne of our Thoughts, into a Trayne of Words;

and that for two commodities; whereof one is, the Registring of the

Consequences of our Thoughts; which being apt to slip out of our memory,

and put us to a new labour, may again be recalled, by such words

as they were marked by. So that the first use of names, is to serve

for Markes, or Notes of remembrance. Another is, when many use

the same words, to signifie (by their connexion and order,)

one to another, what they conceive, or think of each matter;

and also what they desire, feare, or have any other passion for.

and for this use they are called Signes. Speciall uses of Speech

are these; First, to Register, what by cogitation, wee find to be

the cause of any thing, present or past; and what we find things present

or past may produce, or effect: which in summe, is acquiring of Arts.

Secondly, to shew to others that knowledge which we have attained;

which is, to Counsell, and Teach one another. Thirdly, to make known

to others our wills, and purposes, that we may have the mutuall help

of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight our selves, and others,

by playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently.

Abuses Of Speech

To these Uses, there are also foure correspondent Abuses.

First, when men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy

of the signification of their words; by which they register for their

conceptions, that which they never conceived; and so deceive themselves.

Secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is, in other sense

than that they are ordained for; and thereby deceive others.

Thirdly, when by words they declare that to be their will, which is not.

Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another: for seeing nature

hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns,

and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of Speech,

to grieve him with the tongue, unlesse it be one whom wee are obliged

to govern; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.

The manner how Speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence

of causes and effects, consisteth in the imposing of Names,

and the Connexion of them.

Names Proper & Common

Universall

Of Names, some are Proper, and singular to one onely thing; as Peter,

John, This Man, This Tree: and some are Common to many things;

as Man, Horse, Tree; every of which though but one Name,

is nevertheless the name of divers particular things; in respect of

all which together, it is called an Universall; there being nothing

in the world Universall but Names; for the things named, are every one

of them Individual and Singular.

One Universall name is imposed on many things, for their similitude

in some quality, or other accident: And whereas a Proper Name

bringeth to mind one thing onely; Universals recall any one of those many.

And of Names Universall, some are of more, and some of lesse extent;

the larger comprehending the lesse large: and some again of equall extent,

comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example, the Name Body

is of larger signification than the word Man, and conprehendeth it;

and the names Man and Rationall, are of equall extent, comprehending

mutually one another. But here wee must take notice, that by a Name

is not alwayes understood, as in Grammar, one onely word; but sometimes

by circumlocution many words together. For all these words,

Hee That In His Actions Observeth The Lawes Of His Country,

make but one Name, equivalent to this one word, Just.

By this imposition of Names, some of larger, some of stricter

signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of

things imagined in the mind, into a reckoning of the consequences

of Appellations. For example, a man that hath no use of Speech

at all, (such, as is born and remains perfectly deafe and dumb,)

if he set before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles,

(such as are the corners of a square figure,) he may by meditation

compare and find, that the three angles of that triangle, are equall

to those two right angles that stand by it. But if another triangle

be shewn him different in shape from the former, he cannot know

without a new labour, whether the three angles of that also be

equall to the same. But he that hath the use of words, when he observes,

that such equality was consequent, not to the length of the sides,

nor to any other particular thing in his triangle; but onely to this,

that the sides were straight, and the angles three; and that that was all,

for which he named it a Triangle; will boldly conclude Universally,

that such equality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever;

and register his invention in these generall termes, Every Triangle Hath

Its Three Angles Equall To Two Right Angles. And thus the consequence

found in one particular, comes to be registred and remembred,

as a Universall rule; and discharges our mentall reckoning,

of time and place; and delivers us from all labour of the mind,

saving the first; and makes that which was found true Here, and Now,

to be true in All Times and Places.

But the use of words in registring our thoughts, is in nothing

so evident as in Numbering. A naturall foole that could never learn

by heart the order of numerall words, as One, Two, and Three,

may observe every stroak of the Clock, and nod to it, or say one,

one, one; but can never know what houre it strikes. And it seems,

there was a time when those names of number were not in use;

and men were fayn to apply their fingers of one or both hands,

to those things they desired to keep account of; and that thence

it proceeded, that now our numerall words are but ten, in any Nation,

and in some but five, and then they begin again. And he that

can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will lose himselfe,

and not know when he has done: Much lesse will he be able to add,

and substract, and performe all other operations of Arithmetique.

So that without words, there is no possibility of reckoning of Numbers;

much lesse of Magnitudes, of Swiftnesse, of Force, and other things,